报告题目：Patent Trolls and Corporate R&D Disclosure
报 告 人：余扬新
报告地点：腾讯会议（会议ID：687 620 318）
This study investigates whether and how non-practicing entities (or “patent trolls”) affect corporate narrative R&D disclosure using demand letters. Exploiting the staggered adoption of Anti-Troll legislation in 33 U.S. states as an exogenous shock that limit trolls’ ability to send out bad-faith demand letters, we find that in response to the passage of state Anti-Troll legislation, firms tend to increase both the quantity and details of narrative R&D disclosures. These results are robust to the exclusion of firms that are prone to patent litigation initiated by patent trolls and are robust after controlling the passage of Anti-Troll legislation in firms’ non-headquarter operating states. We further find that this effect is stronger for firms facing higher proprietary costs of disclosure and for firms facing lower levels of information demand from external stakeholders. Overall, our findings suggest that patent trolls, which is an alternative source of firms’ proprietary costs, plays a crucial role in shaping a firm’s R&D disclosure strategy.
余扬新，香港城市大学商学院会计系教授。2011年于香港科技大学会计系获得博士学位，之后在澳大利亚国立大学会计学院担任教职，并于2014年加入香港城市大学会计系。他的研究领域包括公司披露，高管薪酬，企业社会责任。成果发表于Journal of Accounting and Economics, The Accounting Review, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Strategic Management Journal等会计、金融、管理期刊。
撰稿：曲琦 审核：刘行 单位：bob体官网手机版会计学院