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【报告人简介】

江韶飞，波恩大学豪斯多夫数学中心及微观经济研究所博士后。2022年获得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校经济学博士学位，主要研究方向是信息经济学和博弈论。近期的研究专注于利益冲突的多个经济人如何获取和传递信息。

【内容摘要】

I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. I microfound the cost of an experiment via a Wald's sequential sampling problem and show that it equals the expected reduction in a weighted log-likelihood ratio function evaluated at the sender's belief. I focus on equilibria satisfying the D1 criterion. The equilibrium outcome depends on the relative costs of drawing good and bad news in the experiment. If bad news is more costly, there exists a unique separating equilibrium outcome, and the receiver unambiguously benefits from the sender's private information. If good news is sufficiently more costly, the single-crossing property fails. There exists a continuum of pooling equilibria, and the receiver strictly suffers from sender private information in some equilibria.

【参会方式】

腾讯会议号：605 688 721

腾讯会议链接：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/rCEAs6kCUZQR

【更多信息】

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撰稿：王杰 审核：齐鹰飞 单位：高等经济研究院