报告题目：Peers’ Disclosure of Investment Plans and Market Feedback to Managers
报 告 人：贾晓莉
报告地点：腾讯会议（会议号 190 329 610）
Capex guidance disclosed by a firm’s peers provides useful information about their investment plans. We document a positive association between peers’ capex guidance and managerial learning about investment opportunities from stock prices, as captured by investment-q sensitivity, which is consistent with peers’ disclosure of investment plans encouraging investors’ information processing and thereby providing stock price-based feedback to managers. In cross-sectional analyses to provide further support for this argument, we find that this relationship is more pronounced when peers’ guidance is more informative, when managers have more incentives to learn from stock prices, and when the market can aggregate private information more effectively. Finally, we document that in the long term, firms’ product market share increases when peers disclose their capex guidance, suggesting that improvement in managerial learning translates into better product market performance. Overall, this paper offers insight into how peers’ disclosure of investment plans influences information feedback from the market to the focal firm.
贾晓莉，香港大学会计学博士后，香港理工大学会计学博士。研究领域包括企业信息披露与投资、银行会计、信息中介等。相关成果发表于European Accounting Review（已录用）。 参与Hong Kong Research Grants Council General Research Fund、国家自然科学基金项目。
撰稿：曲琦 审核：许浩然 单位：会计学院