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·¢²¼ÈÕÆÚ :2025-04-07



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Abstract£ºWe examine whether and how analysts¡¯ incentives to win the All-Star award by strategically increasing visibility among fund managers affect their research quality and career outcomes. We first document that analysts have stronger incentives to make more fund managers aware of their existence in the third calendar quarter of the year (Q3), the quarter right before star analyst voting, than in any other quarter; they issue earnings forecasts more frequently, but write research reports with a smaller average length, and are more likely to cover a new firm. We exclude several alternative explanations, including that analysts¡¯ strategic behaviors just proxy for analyst ability and general career concern. The results are more pronounced for analysts with stronger incentives to become a star analyst, for firms with higher institutional ownership, and when analysts work for a smaller brokerage house. We refer to analyst forecasts driven by incentives to seek visibility among fund managers as Visible forecasts. We find that Visible forecasts are less accurate but bolder than peer forecasts. Visible forecasts are also associated with smaller market reactions. We further show that fund managers respond to these Visible forecasts partly: in the post-Q3, they are more likely to time their corporate site visit to coincide with when analysts issuing higher-quality Visible forecasts is visiting the firm. Lastly, we find that while issuing more accurate Visible forecasts helps analysts¡¯ chances of attaining All-Star status, seeking visibility is also costly. In an industry with more intensive competition, analysts who issue less accurate Visible forecasts are more likely to be penalized to decline to a less prestigious brokerage house or even exit the profession. Overall, our findings document an underexplored analysts¡¯ opportunistic practice to win the All-Star award.


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